What Chemical Weapons Did Syria Use

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• Open Access
• Published: 19 February 2018

Responding to chemical weapons violations in Syrian arab republic: legal, health, and humanitarian recommendations

• Timothy B. Erickson²,
• Stephanie Kayden³,
• Raul Ruiz⁴,
• Stephen Wilkinson¹ &
• …
• Frederick M. Burkle Jr¹

Conflict and Health book 12, Article number:12 (2018) Cite this article

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Abstract

Background

The repeated utilize of prohibited chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict poses serious health, humanitarian, and security threats to civilians, healthcare personnel, and first responders. Moreover, the apply of chemical weapons constitutes a clear and egregious violation of international law—probable amounting to a war crime—for which connected impunity is setting a dangerous precedent in relation to current and futurity conflicts. This contend article calls upon concerned states, organizations, and individuals to respond urgently and unequivocally to this serious breach of international legal and humanitarian norms.

Main Body

Based on health, humanitarian, and legal findings, this article calls for concrete action to: ane) reduce the risk of chemic weapons existence used in current and future conflicts; ii) review and support the preparedness equipment and antitoxin supplies of first responders, humanitarian organizations, and military forces operating in Syria; iii) support international mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing the prohibition on chemical weapons, including through criminal accountability; 4) support civilian victims of chemical weapons attacks, including refugees; and 5) re-commit to the complete elimination of chemic weapons in compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993), a comprehensive treaty that bans chemical weapons and requires their complete destruction.

Conclusion

All involved states and organizations should have urgent steps to ensure the protection of the most vulnerable victims of conflict, including victims of chemic weapons attacks in Syria, and to reinforce international law in the face up of such serious violations.

Background

In the deadliest use of chemic weapons in Syrian arab republic since August 2013, at least 83 people were killed, including 28 children, and over 293 people were reported injured by a confirmed sarin gas attack on the northern rebel-held area of Khan Shaykhun, Idlib Province, Syria on April 4, 2017, carried out by the Syrian government [1]. The attack followed in a pattern of repeated utilize of chemic weapons in the Syrian conflict which poses serious health, humanitarian, and security threats to civilians, healthcare personnel, and first responders in Syria. Moreover, the apply of chemical weapons constitutes a clear and egregious violation of international law—in particular, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)—likely amounting to a war law-breaking for which continued impunity is already setting a dangerous precedent for current and future conflicts and imperiling global public health.

History of chemical warfare in Syrian arab republic and elsewhere

The use of chemical weapons is rare in modern warfare. The first mod employ of large-scale chemic warfare dates back to World War I, when all major belligerents used or attempted to use chlorine gas, mustard agents, and/or phosgene, killing an estimated 100,000 troops. In 1988, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein used mustard gas and nerve agents against Iranian ground forces and Kurdish rebels, killing thousands [2].

The declared use of internationally banned chemic weapons such as sarin and chlorine gas in Syria tin be traced back to 2013, when the showtime reports became known in many locations, including Khan Al Asal, [3] Sarqib, [iv] Ghouta, [5] and Jobar [6]. According to the most recent statistics, there have been 234 separate and documented chemical attacks since the first of the Syrian war, resulting in over xiii,000 injuries and 3415 deaths [7]. Two hundred xi of these attacks were attributed to chlorine gas alone, or chlorine with traces of sarin.

The United Nations (UN), on numerous occasions, has confirmed the use of chemic weapons in Syria. Betwixt March 2013 and March 2017, the UN Human Rights Quango-mandated Commission of Inquiry on Syria "documented 25 incidents of chemical weapons apply in the Syrian Arab Commonwealth, of which 20 were perpetrated by government forces and used primarily against civilians," non including the Khan Shaykhun attack in April 2017 [eight]. These incidents have entailed the employ of sarin, which has been used in multiple incidents, [nine] as well as other chemical weapons, foremost among them chlorine gas, which has reportedly get "almost routine" in northern Syria [10].

Wellness and medical impacts of sarin gas and other nerve agents

The wellness and medical impacts of chemical weapons are astringent, firsthand, and life threatening, causing horrendous injuries and rapid expiry, especially for children. Upon exposure to nerve agents, for example, victims are likely to experience drooling, airsickness, and diarrhea, followed by paralysis and asphyxiation. Those who exercise not die are likely to suffer from long-term neurological harm. Contributing to the cruelty of these weapons, chemical attacks are especially deadly for civilians sheltering beneath basis from conventional weapons attacks, since gas agents are often denser than air and tin therefore transform basements or bomb shelters into decease traps [11].

Exposure and poisoning past a nerve agent like sarin or venomous agent X, also known as VX, disrupts cholinergic transmission of the nervus signals throughout the torso, leading to symptoms that may include constriction of pupils (miosis), profuse salivation, involuntary urination and defecation, respiratory distress, muscle paralysis, loss of consciousness, and seizures. Death may effect past asphyxiation and bronchospasm due to a loss of control of the respiratory muscles and inability to clear pulmonary secretions (bronchorrhea).

Symptoms volition appear within a few seconds subsequently exposure to the vapor form, and from within a few minutes to upward to several hours after exposure to the liquid class. Whatever liquid contact with the pare, unless done off immediately, could exist fatal. Children are more vulnerable than adults to the lethal effects because of their closer proximity to the ground, smaller trunk mass, college respiratory rate, increased skin permeability, and immature metabolic systems [12].

Response and treatment

Recovery from nerve agent exposure is possible with focused and immediate treatment, but available antidotes must exist used rapidly to be effective. If victims have been exposed to a nervus agent, they should be removed from the source of the exposure and evacuated into fresh air. Skin decontamination of toxic chemic warfare nerve agents is crucial for mitigating the systemic toxicity. Contaminated vesture should be removed by rescuers wearing personal protective equipment. Rescuers should besides rapidly wash and decontaminate the victims with soap and copious amounts of h2o and should remove and dispose of habiliment in a sealed, secure biological plastic pocketbook to avoid secondary exposure. Family members and rescue personnel risk cross-contamination and secondary toxicity if not fairly protected with latex gloves and proper equipment when treatment and treating victims.

The footing for the medical management of nerve agent-poisoned casualties is derived from clinical experience with pesticide poisoning [13]. The two pillars of treatment include parenteral administration of atropine (2-6 mg every 5–ten min) to counter the muscarinic effects of excess acetylcholine, and 1-two one thousand of pralidoxime (two-PAM) to carve the nerve agent from acetylcholinesterase and restore the active site. Atropine should be administered until symptoms of bradycardia, bronchospasm, and bronchorrhea resolve, a procedure that may require extraordinarily high doses of atropine. Electric current military field treatments for nervus agent intoxication include auto-injectors containing atropine and 2-PAM, which help to restore the manual of nerve signals in the body [14]. With severe cases of nerve amanuensis poisoning, large doses of atropine may exist required, oft exceeding available supplies. In many low- or middle-income countries such as Syria, ii-PAM is too costly and not readily available. A flood of victims after a nerve agent attack such as sarin gas may speedily deplete hospital supplies of atropine and two-PAM. Moreover, although much of the current atropine supply in Syria is expired, healthcare providers should be aware that, if necessary, these antidotes may be used on an emergency basis beyond their expiration date [15].

Several leading concerns with regard to the firsthand humanitarian response include:

• The absence of available applied science for identifying which chemical agent has been used, impacting upon immediate response, attribution, and accountability efforts [xvi]

• The lack of sufficient personal protective equipment for starting time responders (whether civil or armed services)

• Insufficient antitoxin reserves (particularly oxides [2-PAM])

• The danger of rescuers or grieving families subjecting themselves to toxic exposure, whether from the victim's secretions (lung secretions, vomit, diarrhea) or directly from the nerve agent itself if the skin is non properly decontaminated

Moreover, beyond the particular concerns outlined above, the ability of healthcare providers to answer to the use of chemical weapons has been severely hampered by the directly and repeated targeting of medical facilities and personnel—a state of war criminal offence under international law—including by the use of conventional and chemic weapons [8]. This "weaponisation of health intendance" has made Syria "the nigh dangerous place on earth for health-care providers": over 800 health workers take been killed in the conflict, [17] and many more injured, incarcerated, or tortured, sparking a mass exodus of healthcare workers from the state [18]. This unprecedented challenge to medical humanitarianism, and the failure of the international community to effectively answer, has given rise to growing calls for rethinking the provision of healthcare and humanitarian assistance in conflict [nineteen].

Strict prohibition of chemic weapons under international law

The use of chemic weapons in armed conflict non only poses a serious chance to the health of civilians but likewise is strictly and unambiguously prohibited under international law. Warring parties are prohibited from using chemic weapons in any situation or circumstances (in international or non-international armed conflict) against whatsoever persons (civilians or soldiers). Chemical weapons may also not be used in retaliation for a previous chemical weapons attack.

These prohibitions date back to the late 19th century [20] and were most recently articulated and developed in the 1993 CWC, which entered into force in 1997. The CWC prohibits the use, development, product, stockpiling, and transfer of chemical weapons, and it established the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for the purposes of implementation [21]. The CWC obliges parties to: destroy all existing chemic weapons and production facilities under international verification; monitor the chemic industry to prevent the emergence of new weapons; provide assistance and protection to States Parties confronting chemical threats; and foster the peaceful use of chemical science. Considering its near universal membership (with 192 States Parties at nowadays) and intrusive verification mechanisms, the CWC is widely considered to be one of the nigh successful disarmament treaties. Simply four states—Arab republic of egypt, Democratic people's republic of korea, Southward Sudan, and Israel (which has signed but non ratified)—remain outside of the convention [11].

As of October 2016, the OPCW verified that approximately 90% of the globe'southward declared stockpile of 72,304 metric tons of chemical agent had been destroyed, [22] including xc% of the U.S.'southward alleged stockpile of 33,600 metric tons of chemical agent, in line with States Parties' obligations to piece of work towards complete disarmament.

Syrian chemic weapons disarmament

While not previously a fellow member, Syrian arab republic agreed to join the CWC following international force per unit area sparked by the August 2013 Ghouta attack [23]. It became a party to the CWC in September 2013 (with entry into strength in October) and reported an inventory of 1300 tons of chemic agents and precursors to the OPCW. Past June 2014, the OPCW had verified the destruction of 24 of Syria's 27 alleged product and storage facilities (the remaining sites were accounted too unsafe to visit) and the removal from the country of all of Syria's declared chemical weapons.

Since then, nevertheless, suspicions of undeclared stockpiles (including of sarin, chlorine, and ricin) and reports of chemical weapons use in Syrian arab republic take persisted. UN investigators establish "compelling confirmation" of the use of chemic weapons in Syria in 2014 and 2015, leading the UN to plant the "OPCW-United nations Joint Investigative Mechanism," which later attributed responsibleness to the Syrian government (on iii occasions) and ISIS (on ane occasion) [24].

In calorie-free of the evidence of continued possession and use of chemic weapons in Syrian arab republic, and the volatility and complexity of the electric current conflict, concerns likewise exist over the potential for the Syrian authorities to transfer such weapons to non-state actors (such as Hezbollah in Lebanon) or to other states (such as Iran or Democratic people's republic of korea). The risk also exists, especially in the event of regime collapse, that the Syrian authorities could lose control of these weapons, resulting in further proliferation. Given the events that this section has described, information technology is apparent that there is an immediate need to understand the extent of remaining undeclared weapons stockpiles in Syria—including potential bio-weapons capabilities—and to piece of work toward their destruction.

Enforcement

As the conflict in Syria becomes increasingly circuitous due to a range of factors—including the conflict's protracted nature, the plethora of fragmented armed groups operating in the country, and the geopolitical importance of the conflict—information technology is critical to consider the international diplomatic force per unit area points that may prevent Syrian arab republic from using chemical weapons in the time to come and to hold those responsible to account. Both sanctions and criminal accountability measures are available to states and the international community to enforce the international ban on the apply of chemic weapons. From a humanitarian perspective, it is also crucial that whatever such actions be accompanied by measures to mitigate the impact on already vulnerable populations.

Condemnation

Outset, states must condemn the apply of chemical weapons in the strongest possible terms. Many political leaders and international bodies have already voiced potent ethical and legal objections condemning the use of chemical weapons. However, the Security Council (SC) has failed to formally condemn the attacks or accept further action to stop them. On April 12, 2017, the SC tabled a typhoon resolution—backed by the U.Southward., U.K., and France but opposed by Russia with its veto power—which would have condemned the chemical weapons assail in Khan Shaykhun and called for accountability. While standing to piece of work to break the gridlock in the SC, other states should individually and collectively act to forcefully condemn the use of chemic weapons in Syria.

OPCW enforcement powers

2nd, if the OPCW finds a state party to be in violation of the CWC, it may authorize sanctions. The OPCW may non qualify the use of military strength, and although it may consult with the SC to practice so if advisable, the SC itself is express both by individual veto ability and the lack of a military machine response capability apart from Member States. Given the clear prove of repeated violation in Syria – despite the OPCW disarmament mission – the OPCW should use its ability to urge its Member States who accept non already washed so to institute sanctions against Syria over the use of chemic weapons.

Sanctions

Third, sanctions constitute another available and not-military means for states to enforce the ban on chemic weapons vis-à-vis the Syrian regime. In February 2017, Russia bandage its 7th SC veto (and People's republic of china its 6th veto) blocking an attempt by the U.South., U.K., and France to impose collective sanctions on Syria over the use of chemical weapons. In contrast, the SC has passed sanctions against ISIS, Al-Nusra Front, Al-Qaida, and other designated terrorist organizations operating in Syria. A number of states accept nonetheless practical a range of sanctions confronting the Syrian regime and cardinal individuals and organizations supporting the Assad regime since the beginning of the conflict, as have the regional bodies such equally the European Spousal relationship, the Arab League, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. States that have non already done so should consider instituting further sanctions against Syria for chemical weapons-related violations. Still, this should be done with caution, every bit sanctions may also cause disproportionate harm to civilians, raising meaning humanitarian concerns, as discussed in greater detail below.

The responsibility to protect

The widespread and systematic nature of international law violations in the Syrian conflict has also sparked significant contend over the potential awarding of the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). In 2005, recognizing the failure to adequately answer to the nearly heinous crimes known to humankind, earth leaders made a commitment to protect populations from genocide, state of war crimes, indigenous cleansing, and crimes against humanity at the UN Globe Summit. This delivery under R2P stipulates that individual states acquit the master responsibility for the protection of populations from mass atrocity crimes and that the international customs has a responsibility to assist states in fulfilling this responsibleness. Accordingly, under R2P, the international customs should use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means to protect populations from these crimes. If a State fails to protect its populations or is in fact the perpetrator of crimes, the international community must be prepared to have stronger measures, including the collective use of force through the SC. Much of the doctrine of R2P is a restatement of existing commitments, rather than new international police force, though the Syrian context merits considerable reflection on R2P and how the international community tin can collectively renew and live up to its commitments to noncombatant protection [25]. Thus far, the Russian veto on the SC has prevented a collective conclusion to authorize the use of forcefulness to protect civilians in Syria.

Health & humanitarian consequences

From a humanitarian perspective, it is crucial that any enforcement measures—such equally sanctions or the use of Un peace enforcement activeness—consider and mitigate the bear upon on already vulnerable noncombatant populations. For instance, any armed forces action, if deemed appropriate, must be carried out in accordance with international humanitarian police force (IHL), including the obligation to protect civilians from adverse impacts of the disharmonize [26]. Similarly, any sanction measures should ideally exist multilateral, targeted at the members and supporters of the regime, accompanied by humanitarian assistance for vulnerable populations, and combined with other diplomatic efforts and incentives.

Finally, it should be noted that while the employ of chemical weapons constitutes an egregious violation of international law with devastating impacts on civilians, it is far from the just such violation to be committed in the Syrian conflict which needs to be addressed. Parties to the disharmonize, especially the Syrian government, have routinely used other internationally sanctioned weapons, including cluster munitions and incendiary weapons, and have carried out deliberate and systematic attacks on civilians, hospitals, cultural heritage sites, and other protected persons and objects, in direct violation of international law and medical neutrality [27].

Accountability

Information technology is also critical to pursue individual criminal accountability for the use of chemical weapons and other serious violations of international police force committed in Syrian arab republic. While many of these options are currently being pursued in tandem, each faces significant barriers necessitating significantly more international support to achieve even partial justice.

Contained Mechanism to prepare future prosecutions

In Dec 2016, the UN General Assembly established an "Contained Mechanism" to assist in investigation and prosecution of serious international crimes committed in Syrian arab republic. This Mechanism'south aim is to supplement the piece of work of the existing UN Commission of Inquiry on Syrian arab republic by taking on a pre-prosecutorial function: consolidating, preserving, and analyzing testify in order to gear up files to assist in future investigations and prosecutions of those individually responsible for serious international crimes. The effective operation of the Independent Mechanism will depend on sufficient funding and political back up by Fellow member States, and ultimately, the opening upward of avenues for prosecution.

International Criminal Courtroom (ICC)

The International Criminal Court (ICC) offers one potential avenue for pursuing individual criminal accountability for the utilize of chemical weapons in Syria, though political and jurisdictional bug pose significant barriers to its involvement. Established by the Rome Statute in 1998 and beginning operations in 2003, the ICC is the outset permanent international criminal courtroom for the investigation and prosecution of perpetrators of the almost serious international crimes, including the utilise of chemical weapons. Since Syria is non a Land Party to the Rome Statute (and neither are Russia, the U.Due south., Iran, or other primal parties to the Syria conflict), the ICC does not have a clear ground for jurisdiction. The ICC would be able to exercise jurisdiction over the situation in Syria if: 1) the Syrian government ratifies the Rome Statute; 2) the Syrian regime accepts the jurisdiction of the ICC through a annunciation; or iii) the SC refers the situation in Syria to the ICC. With regard to a referral by the SC of the state of affairs in Syrian arab republic to the ICC, this option has thus far been attempted but blocked at the SC by the vetoes of permanent members Russia and Mainland china. The ICC could, even so, exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed by dual nationals of Syria and a country political party to the ICC (e.g., ISIS foreign fighters who are nationals of European ICC Member States). Furthermore, if the ICC were to proceeds jurisdiction over the situation in Syrian arab republic, the Court would nonetheless face a number of hurdles in prosecuting cases, including gaining custody of high-level accused, such as President Assad, and protecting witness and victim participation. The prosecutor would, still, do good from the being of a "staggering" body of testify that has already been gathered and analyzed [28].

Establishment of an advertizement hoc tribunal

Beyond the ICC, the international customs—either through a SC decision or understanding with the affected land—may also set up an ad hoc international or hybrid international-domestic criminal tribunal to prosecute serious international crimes, such equally the use of chemical weapons, as states have done for cases in the one-time Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Lebanon, and Kingdom of cambodia. Some take advocated for the establishment of such an ad hoc tribunal for Syrian arab republic, though the permanent ICC is more often than not considered to exist a more viable option, given the political difficulties and costs of establishing a separate courtroom de novo.

Domestic prosecutions of international crimes

In add-on to international criminal courts, states may also prosecute the use of prohibited chemical weapons in their domestic courts, provided that they have incorporated these international crimes into their domestic criminal codes and are able to gain custody over the defendant (e.g., as refugees, aviary seekers, or foreign fighters). Several prosecutions of accused Syrian war criminals have already been initiated in European states (including Frg, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Kingdom of spain, Sweden, and Switzerland) through the exercise of domestic or universal jurisdiction. These developments indicate that it may also be possible to prosecute further Syrian perpetrators who have fled to Turkey, Jordan, Lebanese republic, or the U.S., besides as dual Syrian nationals or foreign fighters. Given the lack of political will for accountability at the international level, these domestic cases are critically important to advancing justice in the near term. Yet, their overall impact on the situation in Syria is likely to be express. In light of this reality, concerned states and organizations should support legal and investigative efforts in national jurisdictions, while at the same fourth dimension continuing to investigate and prepare cases for future international prosecution and continuing diplomatic efforts to open a path to such eventual international criminal prosecution.

Determination and recommendations

In low-cal of same challenges posed by the repeated utilise of prohibited chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict, this commodity calls upon concerned states, organizations, and individuals—including the U.S.—to respond urgently and unequivocally to these attacks, which represent both a serious breach of international legal and humanitarian norms and a threat to public health. In particular, this newspaper calls for concrete activity to:

• Reply immediately to reduce the risk of chemical weapons beingness used in future conflicts: The repeated and increasing use of chemical weapons in the Syrian disharmonize constitutes a disturbing intermission with a articulate and long-standing prohibition which threatens to set a dangerous precedent for hereafter conflicts. If the utilise of chemical weapons is allowed to become more commonplace, information technology will seriously threaten the life and health of civilians, humanitarian responders, and military machine personnel in conflict settings worldwide.

• Continue to back up international mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing the prohibition on chemic weapons: Organizations such as the OPCW are critical to monitoring and enforcing international prohibitions on chemical weapons. For this reason, the U.S. and other concerned states should provide robust political, financial, and other support to these institutions, including Un bodies playing a fundamental role in disarmament.

• Back up nonproliferation efforts: Such efforts include national cooperative threat reduction programs to prevent the proliferation of chemical, biological and other prohibited weapons in and from Syria, and to increment the capacity of neighboring states to interdict weapons transfers.

• Strengthen commitment to reducing national stockpiles: States—foremost existence Russia and the U.S.—which remain behind schedule for completing full disarmament nether the CWC should redouble efforts to achieve the target of 100% disarmament. This will transport a positive signal to other states that chemical weapons have no place in warfare or armed services arsenals.

• Review and support the preparedness of offset responders, humanitarian organizations, and military machine forces: Given the interest of an array of military, humanitarian, and other actors in the Syrian conflict, also as the transnational threat of chemical weapons attacks in the region, it is imperative to review and back up preparedness to respond in the result of any hereafter chemic attack. Responders must have up-to-date preparedness training, personal protective equipment, and medical resource, including adequate and readily available supplies of antidotes including atropine and oximes.

• Support efforts toward criminal accountability for serious violations of international law in Syria: The U.S. and other concerned states and organizations should play a key role in supporting accountability efforts at both the international and national level for the use of chemic weapons too equally other serious violations of IHL.

• Support refugees and other victims of the disharmonize: The employ of chemical weapons in Syria highlights the brutal bear upon of the conflict on civilians, and the need for states to uphold their commitments to refugee protection in accordance with international police and humanitarian norms, every bit well every bit to support other refugee-hosting countries.

Abbreviations

2-PAM:

Pralidoxime

CWC:

Chemical weapons convention

ICC:

International criminal court

IHL:

International humanitarian law

OPCW:

Organisation for the prohibition of chemical weapons

R2P:

Responsibleness to protect

SC:

Security quango

Un:

Un

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25. International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect. An Introduction to the Responsibility to Protect. http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/alphabetize.php/about-rtop.  Accessed 14 September 2017; On the fence over the awarding of R2P to Syria, see Adams S. Failure to Protect: Syria and the Un Security Quango. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. Occasional Paper Series No. v. March 2015. http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/syriapaper_final.pdf; Syria and the problem of 'responsibility to protect.' The Guardian. 27 Baronial 2013. https://world wide web.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/27/syria-problem-responsibility-to-protect; The Crisis in Syria. International Coalition for the Responsibleness to Protect. http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crunch-in-syria . Accessed 14 September 2017; Gottlieb South. Syria and the Demise of the Responsibility to Protect. The National Interest. five November 2013. http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/syrian arab republic-the-demise-the-responsibility-protect-9360. Accessed 14 Sept 2017.

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Authors and Affiliations

1. Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, Cambridge, MA, The states

   Julia Brooks, Stephen Wilkinson & Frederick Grand. Burkle Jr

2. Section of Emergency Medicine, Brigham and Women's Hospital; Harvard Medical School, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, Cambridge, MA, USA

   Timothy B. Erickson

3. Department of Emergency Medicine, Brigham and Women's Infirmary, Harvard Medical School; and Core Faculty, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, Cambridge, MA, USA

   Stephanie Kayden

4. U.S. House of Representatives for California's 36th congressional district, Washington, D.C., U.s.

   Raul Ruiz

Contributions

JB and SW analyzed the legal and humanitarian policy aspects of the prohibition on chemical weapons and its implementation in Syria. TE and SK analyzed the humanitarian, health and medical response to the use of chemic weapons. RR initiated and framed the conception and design of the paper, guided the framing of key questions and provided insight on the policy aspects of responding to the utilise of chemical weapons. FB provided feedback on international humanitarian health and police force. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

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Correspondence to Julia Brooks.

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The authors are affiliated with the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (HHI), an interfaculty initiative with the mission to advance the science and practice of humanitarian response worldwide through research and education. Based at the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Wellness, HHI serves as the humanitarian arm of Harvard University and brings an interdisciplinary approach to edifice the evidence base of operations of humanitarian studies and professionalizing the field of humanitarian aid.

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Brooks, J., Erickson, T.B., Kayden, S. et al. Responding to chemical weapons violations in Syria: legal, health, and humanitarian recommendations. Confl Health 12, 12 (2018). https://doi.org/x.1186/s13031-018-0143-3

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• Received: x Baronial 2017

• Accepted: 12 January 2018

• Published: 19 February 2018

• DOI : https://doi.org/x.1186/s13031-018-0143-3

Keywords

• Syria
• Chemical weapons
• Nervus agents
• Disaster preparedness
• Conflict zones
• Humanitarian response
• Protection of civilians
• International law
• International treaties
• Un

What Chemical Weapons Did Syria Use,

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